Demystifying Animal Rights by Engel, Mylan, Jr.
178








According to the mysteriousness objection, moral rights are wholly 
mysterious, metaphysically suspect entities. Given their unexplained 
character and dubious metaphysical status, the objection goes, we 
should be ontologically parsimonious and deny that such entities ex-
ist. I defend Tom Regan’s rights view from the mysteriousness objec-
tion. In particular, I argue that what makes moral rights seem meta-
physically mysterious is the mistaken tendency to reify such rights. 
Once we understand what moral rights are and what they are not, we 
will see that rights talk is neither mysterious nor nonsensical. I then 
consider a second aspect of Regan’s rights view that some critics 
have found “mystifying.” I circumvent this objection by identifying 
and defending an alternative rights-conferring property. I conclude 
by pointing out the moral significance of these findings vis-à-vis our 
current treatment of nonhuman animals.
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1. Introduction
In his seminal and groundbreaking work The Case for Ani-
mal Rights (1983), Tom Regan advanced the most comprehen-
sive defense of animal rights to date. There, he offers an argu-
ment from elimination to show that the rights view provides 
the best account of our moral duties to our fellow human be-
ings. He begins by arguing that the other leading approaches to 
ethics fail: Utilitarianism fails because it sanctions sacrificing 
individuals for trivial gains in aggregate utility, something the 
rights view would never condone. Contractarianism fails be-
cause it entails that we have no direct duties to those humans 
(e.g., human infants and intellectually disabled humans) who 
are incapable of understanding the social contract. In contrast, 
Regan’s rights view holds that all human beings have equal in-
herent value. Because all humans are equally inherently valu-
able, Regan argues, they have an equal right to be treated in 
ways that respect their inherent value. 
What makes all human beings equally inherently valuable, 
according to Regan, is the fact that they are all equally experi-
encing subjects of a life.1 He explains what it is to be a subject 
of a life as follows: “Individuals are subjects of a life if they are 
able to perceive and remember; if they have beliefs, desires, 
1 Here, for ease of exposition, I am bracketing pre-sentient human fetuses, 
anencephalic humans, and irreversibly comatose humans. Obviously, these 
humans are not experiencing subjects of a life. Regan argues that being an 
experiencing subject of a life is sufficient for having inherent value and the 
right to respectful treatment, but he never claims that it is necessary for hav-
ing inherent value and the rights that such value bestows. To my knowledge, 
throughout his writings, Regan leaves it an open question whether pre-sen-
tient human fetuses have rights. Since nothing in the present paper turns on 
whether these human non-subjects-of-a-life have rights, I will continue to 
speak of “all” humans being subjects of a life, “all” humans having equal 
inherent value, and “all” humans having the rights that such value bestows.
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and preferences; if they are able to act intentionally in pursuit 
of their goals or desires; if they are sentient and have an emo-
tional life” (1983, 264). As such, subjects of a life are someones, 
not somethings; they have biographies, not just histories; and 
they “have an individual experiential welfare, logically inde-
pendent of their utility relative to the interests or welfare of 
others” (1989, 38). Since human infants, senile humans, and 
intellectually disabled humans are all equally experiencing 
subjects of a life, Regan maintains that they have equal inher-
ent value and the same right to respectful treatment as all other 
human beings.
Having argued that all subjects of a life have equal inherent 
value, Regan next observes that humans aren’t the only animals 
who are experiencing subjects of a life. Many nonhuman ani-
mals are also subjects of a life in that they, too, are conscious 
creatures with preferences and individual welfares that are im-
portant to them; they “want and prefer things, believe and feel 
things, recall and expect things” (2016, 11). Since these animals 
are also experiencing subjects of a life, Regan concludes that 
they too have equal inherent value and an equal moral right to 
be treated in ways that respect their value, and as such, they 
cannot be used as a mere means to our ends. When we treat 
inherently valuable animal subjects in ways that reduce them 
to the status of “things,” we fail to respect their inherent value, 
we violate their rights, and we act wrongly, as a result. Since it 
is wrong to treat inherently valuable animal subjects as mere 
things, the rights view calls for “the total abolition of the use of 
animals in science; the total dissolution of commercial animal 
agriculture; [and] the total elimination of commercial and sport 
hunting and trapping” (2016, 3).
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Over the years, in numerous volumes (1983; 2001; 2003; 
2004), Regan has defended the rights view from countless ob-
jections, but there is one objection which, to my knowledge, 
he has not addressed. I call it the mysteriousness objection. 
According to the objection, moral rights are wholly mysteri-
ous, metaphysically suspect entities. What exactly are they? 
Where do they come from? What is the fundamental basis or 
ground of moral rights? Given their unexplained character and 
dubious metaphysical status, the objection goes, we should be 
ontologically parsimonious and deny that such entities exist. 
Collectively, these reasons lead rights nihilists to echo Jeremy 
Bentham in insisting that talk of moral rights is “nonsense” 
and talk of imprescriptible moral rights is “nonsense on stilts” 
(Bentham 1838–43, 501). If moral rights talk is nonsense, then 
so is animal rights talk.
In what follows, I will first argue that Regan’s account 
of moral rights is immune to the mysteriousness objection. 
In particular, I will argue that what makes moral rights talk 
seem metaphysically mysterious is the mistaken tendency to 
reify such rights. Once we understand how Regan conceives 
of rights, we will see that rights talk is neither mysterious nor 
nonsensical. Indeed, we will see that rights ascriptions have 
readily satisfiable truth conditions. We will even see that utili-
tarians are committed to animals having moral rights. Next, I 
will address another aspect of Regan’s rights view that some 
critics (e.g., Stephen Sapontzis, 1987) have found “mystifying,” 
namely, his notion of inherent value. I will circumvent this 
objection by identifying and defending an alternative, much-
less-mysterious, rights-conferring property. Finally, I will con-
clude, as Regan so often does, by pointing out the significance 
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2. Demystifying Moral Rights
Regan (1983, 266–73) follows both John Stuart Mill and Joel 
Feinberg in conceiving of moral rights as valid moral claims. 
He first cites Mill:
When we call anything a person’s right, we mean that 
he has a valid claim on society to protect him in the 
possession of it,… If he has what we consider a suf-
ficient claim, on whatever account, to have something 
guaranteed to him by society, we say that he has a right 
to it.… To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have 
something which society ought to defend me in the 
possession of. (Mill 1861, 66)
To unpack the idea of “rights as valid claims,” Regan draws 
on Feinberg’s highly influential analysis of moral rights. Ac-
cording to Feinberg: “To have a [moral] right is to have a [valid] 
claim to something and against someone, the recognition of 
which is called for . . . by the principles of an enlightened con-
science” (Feinberg 1974, 43–44). Regan embraces the key ele-
ments of Feinberg’s account of moral claim rights, which he 
summarizes as follows:
To make a claim thus involves both claims-to and 
claims-against. It involves claims-against a given in-
dividual, or many individuals, to do or forbear doing 
what is claimed is due, and it involves a claim-to what 
one is claiming is owed. Both these features of making 
a claim are crucial to the process of validating a claim 
that has been made. I cannot have a valid claim (i.e., a 
right) if I do not have a valid claim-against someone, 
and I cannot have a valid claim-against someone if that 
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individual does not have a duty to me to do or forbear 
doing the act I claim is owed me. (1983, 271–72)
Thus, Regan conceives of moral rights as “valid claims that 
have correlative duties”2 (1983, 266). As such, moral rights are 
valid moral claims about that to which the right holder is duly 
entitled. A moral claim is valid if and only if the claimant (or 
her proxy) is justified in making it.3 Since those who possess 
2 There are, of course, competing views of moral rights, but these views are 
irrelevant to the present project. My aim is to show that Regan’s account 
of moral rights is immune to the mysteriousness objection. The fact that 
other conceptions of moral rights might be susceptible to the mysteriousness 
objection has no bearing on whether Regan’s account is susceptible to the 
objection. That said, Regan’s view that moral rights are “valid moral claims 
that have correlative duties” is widely held. We have already seen that Fein-
berg conceives of rights as valid claims to something against others. Wesley 
Hohfeld maintains that rights, in the strictest sense, are claims: 
if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former’s land, 
the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward 
X to stay off the place. If . . . we should seek a synonym for the 
term “right” in this limited and proper meaning, perhaps the word 
“claim” would prove best. (1919, 38; my emphasis)
Joseph Raz makes the point as follows: “A person who says to another ‘I 
have a right to do it’ is not saying that . . . it is not wrong to do it. He is claim-
ing that the other has a duty not to interfere. It is . . . a claim that there are 
some ways of interference which would be wrong because they are against 
an interest of the right-holder” (1994, 259; my emphasis). So, in showing that 
Regan’s account of moral rights is immune to the mysteriousness objection, 
we remove a common but mistaken objection to animal rights, where such 
rights are understood as valid moral claims against moral agents to treat 
animals with respect.
3 Since justification proceeds in terms of reasons, moral rights are grounded 
in non-mysterious moral reasons. The fact that suffering is intrinsically bad 
is a moral reason to refrain from inflicting suffering on others (without just 
cause). In light of this moral reason, for any subject S who is capable of suf-
fering, S (or her proxy) can justly demand that others refrain from causing S 
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moral rights are duly entitled to be treated in ways that respect 
their rights, moral rights generate corresponding moral duties 
on the part of others. Just who has these corresponding duties 
is a function of the right in question. For example, some moral 
rights are acquired, against specific individuals, as a result of 
voluntary agreements by all the parties involved. Suppose a 
borrower signs a promissory note agreeing to repay a $2000 
loan in two months time and a lender lends that borrower the 
money under the terms spelled out in the note. The lender then 
acquires the right to be repaid, and the borrower acquires a 
corresponding duty to repay the money borrowed. In such a 
case, the right is a right to repayment against one specific per-
son, namely, the borrower. But other rights are neither specific 
nor acquired. Your moral right not to be killed is a valid claim 
against all other moral agents that they not intentionally kill 
you (without just cause), and you have this right quite indepen-
dent of any contingent contractual agreements. I will follow 
Regan in referring to such non-acquired moral rights as basic 
moral rights.
 Basic moral rights differ from legal rights in important 
ways. Legal rights are created by governments through acts of 
legislation and can be rescinded by those same governments by 
enacting new laws. As a result, what legal rights one possesses 
is a function of the laws at the time of the country in which one 
resides. In 1900, women in the U.S. did not have a legal right to 
vote. In 1920, women in the U.S. were granted the legal right 
to vote, but women in France still did not have a legal right to 
vote at that time. Thus, one’s legal rights are contingent on the 
legislative actions of governments.
to suffer (without just cause). Accordingly, S has a prima facie right against 
moral agents to not be caused to suffer by those agents.
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Basic moral rights are not contingent in this way. They are 
not created by governments and cannot be revoked by them 
(though governments can violate them). Unlike legal rights, 
which have their basis in legislation, basic moral rights are 
grounded both in reason and in the fundamental moral status 
of their possessors. We rationally judge that certain individuals 
possess properties that morally entitle them to certain forms 
of treatment (or forbearance) on the part of other moral agents. 
Because these individuals are duly entitled to such treatment 
(or forbearance), they have a valid moral claim (i.e., a right) to 
be treated accordingly. 
It is at this point that the mysteriousness objection is likely 
to emerge. The surface grammar of rights ascriptions naturally 
leads us to reify rights. Consider the ascription “John has a 
right not to be harmed.” The surface grammar suggests that 
there is a thing, viz., a right, which John possesses. Once rights 
are quantified over, it’s no surprise that philosophers start to 
worry about the ontological status of such alleged entities, their 
metaphysical basis, etc. But the surface grammar is misleading. 
Claims are not things; rather, they are performances/actions. 
Feinberg shows us the proper path to the non-reification of 
rights with his distinction between making claim to and having 
a claim. Feinberg explains the difference as follows: Making 
claim to X is a speech act in which one demands X as one’s due 
(1973, 64). What, then, is it to have a claim? Feinberg suggests 
that: “having a claim consists in being in a position to claim in 
the performative sense, that is, to make claim to” (1973, 65). 
He continues: 
If this suggestion is correct, then it shows the primacy 
of the verbal over the nominative forms [of “claim”]. 
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It links claims to a kind of activity and obviates the 
temptation to think of claims as things, on the model 
of coins, pencils, and other material possessions which 
we can carry in our hip pockets. (1973, 65; my empha-
sis)
Regan clearly endorses this Feinbergian performative sense 
of rights: “To make a claim is a performance; it is to assert that 
one is oneself entitled, or that someone else is entitled, to treat-
ment of a certain kind and that the treatment is due or owed 
directly to the individual(s) in question” (1983, 271).
Once we realize that rights are valid moral claims, it is obvi-
ous that rights are not things.4 They are performances/speech 
acts (or potential performances/speech acts) by the right holder 
or the right holder’s proxy. They are morally justified demands 
(or potential demands) that the right holder be given what she is 
due. There is nothing mysterious or spooky about an individual 
being duly entitled to a certain form of treatment or forbear-
ance on the part of another. And there is nothing mysterious or 
spooky about demanding that one be treated in the ways that 
4 As Feinberg makes clear, moral rights in the performative sense are not 
concrete objects. A token speech act is neither a concrete object nor an ab-
stract object. And while it is true that any token speech act will be an in-
stant of a speech act type and types are abstract objects, rights—as valid 
claims—don’t reduce to speech act types, because some tokens of a speech-
act type asserting a moral claim will be valid and other tokens of that type 
will be invalid. Consider the claim type ‘I have a right to an abortion.’ A 
token utterance of ‘I have a right to an abortion’ will be valid when uttered 
by a woman who will die if she carries her fetus to term, whereas a token 
utterance of ‘I have a right to an abortion’ will be invalid when uttered by a 
male. Thus, there is reason to think that moral claim rights are neither con-
crete nor abstract entities. As we will see, the truth of animal rights turns, 
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one is duly entitled to be treated. Consequently, rights talk is 
not metaphysically suspect, and it is not nonsensical. Quite the 
contrary, rights ascriptions have clearly delineable truth condi-
tions. Consider the basic (negative) right not to be harmed. The 
rights ascription “S has a basic moral right not to be harmed” 
is true if and only if S (or S’s proxy) is morally justified in de-
manding that all moral agents refrain from harming S (without 
just cause). The crucial point is this: One need not quantify 
over rights in order for rights ascriptions to have readily satisfi-
able truth conditions.
Given this understanding of what rights are (i.e., valid (actual 
or potential) moral claims), we can now see why even hedonis-
tic utilitarians are committed to animal rights (albeit different 
rights than the utility-trumping right to respectful treatment 
that Regan champions). According to hedonistic utilitarianism, 
all sentient beings deserve equal moral consideration. Conse-
quently, when carrying out our utilitarian calculations, we are 
morally required to give equal weight to the like interests of all 
sentient beings. If, however, we don’t give the same moral con-
sideration to a pig’s interest in avoiding suffering that we give 
to our own interest in avoiding the same amount of suffering, 
then we have failed to give that pig the moral consideration she 
is due, and the pig’s proxy could justifiably demand that the pig 
be given the same moral consideration as every other sentient 
being. In short, given the correct understanding of moral rights 
as valid claims, utilitarianism entails that all sentient beings 
have a right to have their interests considered equally with the 
like interests of all other sentient beings. (Note: This won’t be 
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3. Inherent Value vs. the Capacity to Be Harmed
For Regan, the most fundamental moral right is the right to 
respectful treatment. What makes a being worthy of respect is 
the fact that that being has inherent value. Since, according to 
Regan, every subject of a life has equal inherent value, every 
subject of a life has a right to be treated in ways that respect 
that value. 
As Regan himself notes, “Some critics (Sapontzis 1987) al-
lege that the idea [of inherent value] is ‘mystifying,’ meaning 
that it lacks any clear meaning” (2001, 18). Regan responds to 
this criticism as follows:
the notion of inherent value is no less ‘mystifying’ than 
Kant’s idea of end in itself. As applied to human be-
ings, Kant’s idea of an end in itself is an attempt to ar-
ticulate the cherished belief that the value or worth of a 
human being is not reducible to instrumental value.… 
All that the rights view alleges is that the same moral 
judgment be made in those cases where non-human 
animals who are subjects of a life are treated in a simi-
lar fashion. (2001, 18)
While I don’t find the notion of inherent value mystifying, 
those critics who do are likely to find Kant’s notions of human 
dignity and inherent worth equally mystifying. So, it would be 
good if we could identify a rights-conferring property that Re-
gan’s critics won’t find mystifying. That is what I will attempt 
to do in the remainder of this section.
Elsewhere, I have argued that when identifying a rights-con-
ferring property, “the property picked must have some plau-
sible rationale. There must be some reason for thinking that 
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possessing the property in question is necessary and sufficient 
for possessing [the right in question]” (Engel 2016, 46). What 
property must a being possess to have a prima facie right not 
to be harmed? As Feinberg (1974) rightly notes, all and only 
those beings with welfare interests can be harmed or benefited 
in morally significant ways. Since any being capable of being 
harmed has a welfare interest in not being harmed, it is plau-
sible to think that the right not to be harmed is rooted in the 
capacity to be harmed. Since sentient beings are harmed when 
they are forced to suffer, sentient beings have a right not to be 
harmed. In short, there is a highly plausible rationale for pick-
ing sentience as the morally relevant rights-conferring prop-
erty: Any sentient being has welfare interests and the capacity 
to be harmed, and any being with the capacity to be harmed 
has a right not to be harmed. 
While Regan insists that the fundamental moral right is the 
right to respectful treatment, I submit that the fundamental 
moral right is the right not to be harmed. It’s also plausible to 
think that sentient beings with a life worth living are harmed 
by premature death. To see why, consider our commonsense 
understanding of harm. To harm a being is to make that entity 
worse off than that being otherwise would have been.
Harm: For any being X, action A harms X if and only 
if action A makes X worse off than X otherwise would 
have been, had action A not occurred.5
5 An anonymous referee [hereafter, R] objected to my use of this common-
sense account of harm with the following standard objection: “Suppose my 
welfare is currently sky-high (a 10 on a scale of 10) because I’m eating my 
favorite cereal, but later my favorite cereal is replaced with a slightly less 
pleasing cereal, bringing my welfare down from 10 to 9.8. This hardly seems 
like a harm, yet the author’s account implies otherwise since I’m worse-off 
Mylan Engel Jr.
190
© Mylan Engel Jr., 2018
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 21, Issue 1
It follows from Harm that not all deaths are harms. The 
death of a terminally ill, incurable cancer patient wracked with 
pain is not a harm. Every additional day such a person lives 
makes her/him worse off. Death, in such cases, is a relief, a 
benefit.
We can use this general account of harm to explain when 
death harms an animal:
Harmful Death: Death harms an animal to the extent 
that it results in that animal’s life containing less net 
well-being than it would otherwise have contained.
than I would have been had I continued eating my favorite cereal.” First, 
Harm is intended to capture our intuitive commonsense understanding of 
harm—to harm a being is to make that being worse off than she otherwise 
would have been. Second, if R is made worse-off by having R’s favorite 
cereal replaced by R’s second favorite cereal, as R acknowledges in the 
quoted objection, then R is harmed by having R’s favorite cereal replaced 
by R second favorite cereal [Not all harms hurt.]. Third, counterfactuals 
are context dependent. Since harm ascriptions are cashed out in terms of 
counterfactuals, they too are context dependent in the sense that conversa-
tional context determines what the salient counterfactual alternative action/
treatment would have been [see Norcross 2005]. Suppose the alternative to 
taking away R’s favorite cereal and replacing it with R’s second favorite 
cereal were taking away R’s favorite cereal and replacing it with nothing. If 
the latter were the conversationally salient counterfactual alternative, then 
replacing R’s favorite cereal with R’s second favorite cereal would be a ben-
efit since R is better off having R’s second favorite cereal than having no 
cereal at all. Fourth, the point of introducing Harm is to explain when death 
is a harm. Harmful death makes the contextually salient alternative (i.e., 
not being killed) readily apparent. If killing a being B would result in B’s life 
containing less net well-being than B’s life would have contained, were B 
not killed, then killing B harms B. There is nothing particularly controver-
sial here. Stephen Luper makes the same point in his Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy article on death: “To decide whether a person’s death is bad 
for that person, we must compare her actual welfare level to the welfare level 
she would have had if she had not died” (2014, section 3.1).
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Prematurely killing a healthy, sentient being with a life 
worth living results in that being’s life containing considerably 
less net well-being than it would have had if that being were 
allowed to live, and thus harms that being. Since sentient be-
ings have a right not to be harmed, and premature death harms 
any sentient being with a life worth living, the sentience-based 
right not to be harmed entails the right not to be killed. On this 
view, the right not to be killed only extends to those situations 
where death is a harm. This claim requires one important qual-
ification. If the reason a sentient being B does not have a life 
worth living is because B’s right not to be harmed is systemati-
cally being violated, then killing B would still violate B’s right 
not to be killed, because the proper rights-respecting remedy 
to the situation is to stop harming B and to allow B to live the 
worthwhile life that B is capable of living. 
4. Conclusion
I have argued that moral rights are not spooky, mysterious, 
metaphysically suspect entities, but rather are actual (or poten-
tial) speech acts that make a valid moral claim. So understood, 
moral rights ascriptions are true just in case the rights holder 
(or the rights holder’s proxy) is morally justified in demanding 
the treatment (or forbearance) in question from the parties in 
question. Finally, I’ve argued that sentience confers both the 
right not to be harmed and the right not to be killed (when death 
is a harm, i.e., when death reduces net well-being). These con-
clusions have far-reaching moral implications regarding our 
current treatment of nonhuman animals. To see why, consider 
just four of the ways humans routinely treat animals. 
• Worldwide, over 60 billion land animals are reared 
and slaughtered for food each year (FAOSTAT 
2012), nearly all of whom are subjected to some 
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form of mutilation without anesthesia (includ-
ing branding, dehorning, debeaking, tail docking, 
and castration), forced to live in filthy, massively 
overcrowded sheds with no straw or bedding, and 
slaughtered at a fraction of their natural lifespans.
• 50–100 million animals are experimented on an-
nually in scientific laboratories around the world. 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2005, 7) Regan 
highlights the some of the kinds of research con-
ducted on animals: “Experimental procedures in-
clude drowning, suffocating, starving, and burn-
ing; blinding animals and destroying their hearing; 
damaging their brains, severing their limbs, crush-
ing their organs, inducing heart attacks, ulcers, pa-
ralysis and seizures” (2012, 108). By the research-
ers’ own admission, much of this research causes 
the animal subjects “significant and sometimes ex-
treme pain, distress, and injury” (Garrett 2012, 3). 
Many die as a result of the experiments. Those that 
survive are typically killed at the end of the experi-
ment, having outlived their scientific usefulness. 
• Every year, 41 million animals are killed for their 
fur. Methods of killing include trapping, compres-
sion, gassing, and anal electrocution.
• Each year in the U.S. alone, over 200 million ani-
mals are killed for fun by sport hunters. Many of 
these animals are wounded and die slow painful 
deaths, before eventually being tracked down and 
retrieved, if retrieved at all.
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No reasonable person can deny that treating sentient animals 
in these ways harms them. So, if sentient animals have moral 
rights, including the right not to be harmed and the right not to 
be killed, then all of these practices systematically violate their 
rights and ought to be abolished. Indeed, if sentient animals 
have the right not to be harmed and the right not to be killed, 
no other human activity is responsible for a greater number of 
rights violations than our current treatment of animals. Given 
the common-sense case for non-reified animal rights delineat-
ed above, justice—not kindness—demands that we refuse to 
participate in the above practices and that we actively work to 
bring them to an end. In particular, justice—not kindness—re-
quires that we actively refrain from eating animals, wearing 
animals, hunting animals, and using products tested on ani-
mals. To do any less is to participate in an unjust practice and 
to act wrongly where animals are concerned.
As this issue of Between the Species is dedicated to celebrat-
ing Tom Regan’s life-long contributions to animal rights phi-
losophy, it is only fitting to let Tom have the last word:
Animal rights is a simple idea because, at the most 
basic level, it means only that animals have a right to 
be treated with respect. It is a profound idea because 
its implications are far-reaching. How far-reaching? 
Here are a few examples of how the world will have 
to change once we learn to treat animals with respect.
• We will have to stop raising them for their flesh.
• We will have to stop killing them for their fur.
• We will have to stop training them to entertain us.
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• We will have to stop using them in scientific re-
search.
Each example illustrates the same moral logic. When it 
comes to how humans exploit animals, recognition of 
their rights requires abolition, not reform.… Whether 
we exploit animals to eat, to wear, to entertain us, or to 
learn, the truth of animal rights requires empty cages, 
not larger cages. (2004, 9–10)6
References
Bentham, Jeremy. 1838–43. “Anarchical Fallacies.” In The 
Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published under the Super-
intendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Vol. II, Edin-
burgh: William Tait.
Engel Jr., Mylan. 2016. “Do Animals Have Rights and Does It 
Matter if They Don’t?” In The Moral Rights of Animals, 
edited by Mylan Engel Jr. and Gary Comstock, 39–64. 
Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
FAOSTAT. 2012. Food and Agricultural Organization of the 
United Nations Statistical Database. 
Feinberg, Joel. 1973. Social Philosophy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall.
6 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2017 Illinois Philo-
sophical Association Conference. I would like to thank my commentator, 
Nethanel Lipshitz, and those in attendance for their helpful comments. I 
would also like to thank two anonymous referees for Between the Species 
for their helpful comments and suggestions. I dedicate this paper to Tom 
Regan, my long-time friend and mentor. 
Mylan Engel Jr.
195
© Mylan Engel Jr., 2018
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 21, Issue 1
———. 1974. “The Rights of Animals and Unborn Genera-
tions.” In Philosophy and Environmental Crisis, edited by 
William T. Blackstone, 43–68. Athens, GA: The Univer-
sity of Georgia Press.
Garrett, Jeremy. 2012. “The Ethics of Animal Research: An 
Overview of the Debate.” In The Ethics of Animal Re-
search: Exploring the Controversy, edited by Jeremy 
Garrett, 1–15. Cambridge, MA: MIT press.
Hohfeld, Wesley. 1919. Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal Essays, 
edited by Walter Cook. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press.
Luper, Stephen. 2014. “Death.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy.
Mill, John Stuart. 1861. Utilitarianism. 
Norcross, Alastair. 2005. “Contextualism for Consequential-
ists.” Acta Analytica 20, 80–90.
Nuffield Council on Bioethics. 2005. The Ethics of Research 
Involving Animals. 
Raz, Joseph. 1994. Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the 
Morality of Law and Politics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Regan, Tom. 1983. The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press.
Mylan Engel Jr.
196
© Mylan Engel Jr., 2018
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 21, Issue 1
———. 1989. “Ill-Gotten Gains.” In Animal Experimentation: 
The Consensus Changes, edited by Gill Langley, 19-41. 
New York, NY: Chapman and Hall.
———. 2001. Defending Animal Rights. Urbana, IL: Univer-
sity of Illinois Press.
———. 2003. Animal Rights, Human Wrongs. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield.
———. 2004. Empty Cages: Facing the Challenge of Animal 
Rights. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
———. 2012. “Empty Cages: Animal Rights and Vivisec-
tion.” In The Ethics of Animal Research: Exploring the 
Controversy. Edited by Jeremy Garrett, 107–124. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
———. 2016. “The Case for Animal Rights.” In The Moral 
Rights of Animals. Edited by Mylan Engel Jr. and Gary 
Comstock, 3–13. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Sapontzis, Stephen. 1987. Morals, Reason, and Animals. Phila-
delphia: Temple University Press.
